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Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social 
Responsibility? 
Antony Page† 
Robert A. Katz‡ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite vigorous debate since the 1930s, the notion of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) remains in flux.1 Historically on one side of 
the debate was the claim, made perhaps most prominently by Milton 
Friedman, that “there is one and only one social responsibility of busi-
ness—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase 
its profits.”2 On the other side, prominent scholars such as Adolf Berle 
held a contrary view, arguing that corporations should “set forth a pro-
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 1. Corporate social responsibility itself has no clear, readily accepted definition. See, e.g., 
Abagail McWilliams et al., Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategic Implications, 43 J. MGMT. 
STUD. 1, 8 (2006) (claiming that “there is . . . no strong consensus on a definition for CSR”). 
“[W]hilst some see it as a management trend, others view it as a framework of ‘soft regulation’ that 
places new demands on corporations, whilst others present it as a way for corporate actors to assist 
in social and economic development.” Andrew Crane et al., The Corporate Social Responsibility 
Agenda, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 3, 5 (Andrew Crane 
et al. eds., 2008). The debate itself, including the foundational question of whether firms have any 
social responsibilities, remains unresolved. See id. at 3. 
 2. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Sep. 13, 1970, at 133. Earlier in the article, Friedman expresses a more nuanced view 
based on agency theory. Executives are agents of shareholders, with the responsibility to “conduct 
the business in accordance with their [shareholders’] desires.” Id. at 51. Thus, Friedman would allow 
directors to benefit nonshareholder stakeholders, if that is in fact what the shareholders themselves 
want. 
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gram comprising fair wages, security to employees, reasonable service to 
their public, and stabilization of business . . . .”3 
The CSR debate seems to heat up every two decades but with little 
real progress.4 For every company that appears to promote social con-
cerns there is somebody who accuses it of paying mere lip service to 
these concerns.5 Although there have been some legislative advances—
for example, every state has expressly legalized corporate philanthro-
py—few believe there has been substantial meaningful change. 
CSR’s perceived lack of progress created space for progressive cor-
porate law, the most muscular and structural iteration of CSR. Progres-
sive corporate law is a loose term for a collection of proposals aimed at 
remaking corporate law to encourage processes and outcomes more 
beneficial to the interests of nonshareholders with significant stakes in a 
corporation’s activities (i.e., stakeholders).6 Progressive corporate law’s 
main approaches are to grant nonshareholding stakeholders more say or 
representation in corporate decision-making7 and to grant controllers 
more discretion to pursue social objectives. To date, more than half of 
U.S. states have passed “other constituency” statutes that permit or re-
quire directors to consider the impact of at least some decisions on 
groups other than shareholders.8 Berle himself may have contemplated 
something akin to progressive corporate law when he put businesses on 
notice that, should they fail to voluntarily assume greater community 
responsibilities, the government would likely intervene.9 
                                                 
 3. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 312 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932). 
 4. See, e.g., C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical 
Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 78 (2002). 
 5. See, e.g., Steven D. Lydenberg, Envisioning Socially Responsible Investing: A Model for 
2006, J. CORP. CITIZENSHIP, July 2002, at 57 (“Although an increasing number of corporations pub-
lish environmental and health and safety reports, many are simply token efforts—
greenwashing . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 6. See generally PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). Bainbridge 
refers to this approach as “stakeholderism,” which posits that “corporations should be responsive to 
the interests of workers, consumers, and communities, not just to those of shareholders.” Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corpo-
rate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 877 (1997). Others simply refer to it as the stake-
holder perspective. See, e.g., Francis Weyzig, Political and Economic Arguments for Corporate 
Social Responsibility: Analysis and a Proposition Regarding the CSR Agenda, 86 J. BUS. ETHICS 
417, 418 (2009). 
 7. Bainbridge identifies “the corporate law rights of non-shareholder constituencies” as “the 
core of the progressive communitarian project . . . .” Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 877. 
 8. 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4:10 
(3d ed. 2010). 
 9. ADOLF. A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 167 (1954). 
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If the CSR debate recurs like “sunspots,”10 the social enterprise 
movement is perhaps something new under the sun. Social enterprise, as 
we will show,11 is connected to CSR in profound and interesting ways. 
“Social enterprise” is a loose term for businesses that aim to generate 
profits while advancing social goals.12 Proponents of social enterprise 
believe that such businesses can combine the dynamism of for-profit 
firms with the mission-driven zeal more typical of nonprofit organiza-
tions. The movement also seeks legal change, demonstrated most notably 
by the creation of new legal forms including the low-profit limited liabil-
ity company (L3C), the benefit corporation, and the United Kingdom’s 
community interest company.13 These forms were specifically designed 
for businesses committed both to generating a financial return for owner–
investors and to advancing social goals. 
The social enterprise movement and the CSR movement, including 
its progressive corporate law offshoot, appear to have much in common. 
They both seek a “better” world in a broadly left-liberal sense. Both want 
more businesses to take the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders se-
riously and to play a larger role in addressing pressing social and envi-
ronmental problems. Yet there are some critical and underexplored dif-
ferences in each movement’s approach to social change. 
We argue that social enterprise offers an authentic alternative to 
CSR, even though its short-term social impact would likely be smaller. 
This alternative, moreover, is remarkably congenial to mainstream cor-
porate law in ideology and methodology. In one respect, the social enter-
prise movement sidesteps the CSR debate by operating in a different set-
ting—its vision is realized and embodied in new organizational forms 
rather than existing corporations. In another respect, the movement 
shows how mainstream corporate law can accommodate CSR’s and pro-
gressive corporate law’s concerns without fundamental change.  
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II provides a Berle-themed 
synthesis of the CSR debate, including its progressive corporate law ite-
ration. Part III describes the social enterprise movement, its legal agenda, 
                                                 
 10. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 902–03 (citations omitted). 
 11. See, e.g., Wolfgang Bielefeld, Social Entrepreneurship and Social Enterprise, in 1 21ST 
CENTURY MANAGEMENT: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 22 (Charles Wankel ed., 2008), available at 
http://www.sage-ereference.com/management/Article_n3.html (discussing growing interest in topics 
of social entrepreneurship and social enterprise). 
 12. See Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59, 86–
93 (2010) (discussing definitions of social enterprise). 
 13. See infra Part III. The private sector has also attempted to promote an organizational form 
suitable for social enterprise, the B Corporation. See http://www.bcorporation.net (last visited Mar. 
29, 2011).  
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and discusses several new legal forms designed specifically for dual-goal 
businesses. Part IV highlights the overlaps and conflicts between each 
approach, and in light of the longstanding debate, explains the new and 
vital aspects of the social enterprise movement. Specifically, social en-
terprise advances the debate in unexpected ways—the movement appro-
priates some CSR notions and shares some CSR sensibilities, but com-
bines them in a manner that should please corporate contractarians, alarm 
proponents of progressive corporate law, and discomfort some propo-
nents of CSR. Part V offers a brief conclusion. 
II. BERLE & CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Berle is widely recognized as the first serious scholar of corporate 
governance, and he pioneered an analysis based on the separation of 
shareholder ownership and managerial control.14 He also played a pivotal 
role in framing the debate over CSR—fundamentally, what a corporation 
owes to society, above and beyond the benefits it confers as a matter of 
course by operating a profit-maximizing business.15 He was one of the 
first exponents of the view that corporations should be operated solely to 
maximize shareholder wealth—“shareholder primacy”—a position he 
staked out in his famous debate with E. Merrick Dodd in the pages of the 
1931–1932 issues of Harvard Law Review.16 Less well-known, Berle 
revised his position in later works and argued in favor of broader social 
obligations for corporations. 
A. Berle as Shareholder Wealth Maximizer 
In Berle’s 1931 article—his opening shot—Berle asserted “that all 
powers granted to a corporation or to the management . . . are necessarily 
and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the share-
                                                 
 14. Berle completed his seminal work in collaboration with Gardiner Means. See, e.g., BERLE 
& MEANS, supra note 3, at 4 (declaring in Book One, subtitled “Separation of the attributes of own-
ership under the corporate system,” that “the corporation is a means whereby the wealth of innumer-
able individuals has been concentrated into huge aggregates and whereby control over this wealth 
has been surrendered to a unified direction”). 
 15. “The basic questions at the heart of CSR are as old as business itself, such as what is a 
business for and what contribution does it make to society?” Crane et al., supra note 1, at 3–4; see 
also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 
439, 441 (2001) (arguing that “as a consequence of both logic and experience, there is convergence 
on a consensus that the best means to this end (that is, the pursuit of aggregate social welfare) is to 
make corporate managers strongly accountable to shareholder interests and, at least in direct terms, 
only to those interests”). 
 16. See A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1365, 1367 (1932). 
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holders as their interest appears.”17 In his 1932 rebuttal to Dodd’s re-
sponse, he argued that 
you can not abandon emphasis on “the view that business corpora-
tions exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stock-
holders” until such time as you are prepared to offer a clear and rea-
sonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone 
else. . . . Otherwise the economic power now mobilized and massed 
under the corporate form . . . is simply handed over, weakly, to the 
present administrators with a pious wish that something nice will 
come out of it all.18 
At that time, he apparently believed there was no available “clear and 
reasonably enforceable scheme” and that Dodd’s suggestions regarding 
“the business corporation as an economic institution which has a social 
service as well as a profit-making function” could not be implemented.19 
In the same vein, Berle’s classic 1932 text, The Modern Corpora-
tion and Private Property (co-authored with Gardner Means), was in part 
a call for corporate management to act as trustees for shareholders.20 
Noting the separation of ownership and control, and thus the potential for 
corporate controllers to take advantage of shareholders,21 he argued in 
favor of a trustee model—directors should act as trustees of the corpora-
                                                 
 17. A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 
(1931). 
 18. Berle, supra note 16, at 1367–68 (1932). 
 19. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1145, 1148 (1932). 
 20. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3, at 220. Book 2, Chapter 7 of The Modern Corporation is, 
in fact, largely a reprint of Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust. It repeats, for example, the claim 
that “all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation, or to any group 
within the corporation, whether derived from statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at all 
times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears.” Id. The 
Modern Corporation is now remembered most for its elaboration of the separation of ownership and 
control. See, e.g., Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th-Century 
American Legal Thought, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 179, 180 (2005). 
 21. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that “the interests of owner and of ultimate 
manager may, and often do, diverge”). The diverging interests of owners (as principals) and manag-
ers (as agents) are today referred to as agency costs. Fama and Jensen define agency costs as those 
associated with “structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts among agents with conflict-
ing interests.” Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. 
& ECON. 301, 304 (1983). “Shareholders’ agency costs are reduced, among other things, by product 
and employment markets, large shareholders monitoring performance, and the usually efficient 
capital markets that provide accurate pricing and the threat of a takeover.” Antony Page, Has Corpo-
rate Law Failed? Addressing Proposals for Reform, 107 MICH. L. REV. 979, 989 (2009). In a work 
generally critical of shareholder primacy, Professor Lynn Stout described the agency cost argument 
as arguably the best standard argument in favor of shareholder primacy. See Lynn A. Stout, Bad and 
Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1189, 1199 (2002). 
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tion’s property on behalf of shareholder-beneficiaries.22 In support of this 
model, Berle advanced the now standard argument that if managers owe 
fiduciary duties to multiple masters, they are effectively unconstrained.23 
Berle sought means to “establish a legal control which will more effec-
tually prevent corporate managers from diverting profit into their own 
pockets from those of stockholders . . . .”24 He recognized this as an im-
perfect solution, but concluded (or hoped) that shareholders’ “expecta-
tion of fair dealing” would serve to constrain management.25 
Berle’s position is often seen as the source of today’s widely held 
shareholder wealth maximization norm.26 “[M]anagers of the corporation 
should be charged with the obligation to manage the corporation in the 
interests of its shareholders” is one component of the mainstream ap-
proach to corporate law, referred to by Hansmann and Kraakman as the 
shareholder-oriented or standard model.27 
The shareholder-oriented model is generally supported by theorists 
who see the business organization as a “nexus-of-contracts” rather than a 
single entity.28 The nexus is a complex “web of explicit and implicit con-
tracts” between and among suppliers of various inputs—labor, debt capi-
tal, equity capital, and so on—acting in concert to produce goods or ser-
vices.29 For such contractarians, corporate law provides default rules sub-
ject to contractual opt-outs, and these rules serve as a kind of “standard 
form agreement” that approximates “what parties would rationally agree 
to in the absence of any pre-existing set of imposed terms.”30 Sharehold-
er wealth maximization is such a default rule.31 Corporate contractarians 
generally “believe that nonshareholder constituencies are adequately pro-
                                                 
 22. See William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. 
L. 737, 762–65 (2001). 
 23. Berle, supra note 16, at 1367 (“When the fiduciary obligation of the corporate management 
and ‘control’ to stockholders is weakened or eliminated, the management and ‘control’ become for 
all practical purposes absolute.”); see also William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder 
Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 129 
(2008) (“The key insight that Berle attributed to these corporate lawyers is that a management-
coordinated, multiple constituency system simply would not work.”); Page, supra note 21, at 994–
95. 
 24. Dodd, supra note 19, at 1147 (describing Berle’s views). 
 25. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3, at 243. 
 26. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 444 n.6. 
 27. Id. at 441; see id. at 440–43 (describing the shareholder-oriented model). 
 28. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 859 (citing Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and 
Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 318–28 (1993)). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 865 n.31. 
 31. Although contractarianism does not require shareholder wealth maximization, proponents 
“have tended to advance the primacy of shareholder interests in corporate governance.” Hansmann 
& Kraakman, supra note 15, at 441 n.5. 
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tected through contract and/or general welfare law,” and that “corporate 
law should not be called upon to provide these constituencies with extra 
protections.”32 
B. Berle as Proponent of the Community 
Notwithstanding Berle’s seminal role in outlining the case of share-
holder primacy, his concerns went beyond a corporation’s internal ar-
rangements. He pondered the problem of big business and the resulting 
concentration of power, focusing on the largest corporate actors—the 
“few hundred large corporations” that were “the crux of American indus-
trial life.”33 He observed that whatever a large corporation does—
providing goods, services, employment, and a return to investors—it 
“exert[s] powerful influence on the framework of community life.”34 
Berle’s views on corporate arrangements and societal roles were 
nuanced and evolved substantially over time.35 In 1954, Berle announced 
that “at least for the time being,” Dodd’s argument that corporate powers 
were held in trust for the community (rather than for shareholders) had 
prevailed.36 This concession prompted a description of Berle as “a colla-
teral antecedent of today’s CSR advocates, not a great-grandfather.”37 
The Modern Corporation itself is an equivocal work. Although the bulk 
of it advances a trustee model of corporate governance in favor of share-
holders, it also contains language pointing to a broader social under-
standing of corporations.38 To reflect Berle’s changing views, several 
commentators now refer to an “early” and “middle” or “late” Berle.39 
                                                 
 32. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 877; see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 442. 
 33. Berle, supra note 16, at 1365. 
 34. BERLE, supra note 9, at 169–70. 
 35. Bratton & Wachter explain that this contradiction resulted from when the different parts of 
the book were written. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 23, at 121–22. Berle’s move toward corpora-
tions’ greater social responsibility occurred after large parts of the book had been prepared. Id. 
 36. BERLE, supra note 9, at 169; see also Adolf A. Berle, Jr., “Control” in Corporate Law, 58 
COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1212 (1958) (“The late Professor E. Merrick Dodd of Harvard insisted, and 
history seems to have vindicated him, that [large corporations] are also stewards for the employed 
personnel, for customers and suppliers, and indeed for that section of the community affected by 
their operations. Any reasonable consideration of the responsibilities resting on the management of 
any large corporation, especially of the two or three hundred giants, will support this view.” (cita-
tions omitted)). In an interesting twist, Dodd had also changed his views, believing that the early 
Berle had been proven correct. 
 37. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 23, at 149. 
 38. Id. at 103 (“The conflict follows from contradictions in Berle’s texts, with parts of The 
Modern Corporation and the [1932 article] supporting a shareholder primacy reading, while other 
passages in The Modern Corporation presage CSR.”); see also Tsuk, supra note 20, at 181–82 (ar-
guing that for The Modern Corporation’s authors, “the important message of the book was a politi-
cal argument about the allocation of power in society, particularly the allocation of power between 
the state and a wide range of collective institutions”); Allan C. Hutchinson, Hurly-Berle—Corporate 
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In The Modern Corporation’s introduction and final chapter, Berle 
adopted a more communitarian or stakeholder-oriented perspective. He 
further suggested that “the last chapter was what the book was all 
about—a few pages for the general reader ‘too lazy, busy or uninterested 
to read three hundred pages of academic argument.’”40 
He saw three alternatives for the governance of these companies. 
The first was his own trustee model described above—that a corpora-
tion’s controllers act as trustees “for the operation of the corporation for 
the sole benefit of the security owners.”41 This option was preferable (or 
rather, “the lesser of two evils”)42 to the second, which was to view con-
trollers to have acquired the power to run the corporation in their own 
interests based on a “quasi-contractual” theory of shared understanding.43 
In the last chapter of The Modern Corporation, Berle expressed 
preference for a third model. Shareholders, because of their passivity and 
inattention, no longer deserved the benefit implied by strict ownership or 
property rights. Controllers, although helping to weaken the claims of 
shareholders by arrogating power to themselves, likewise had no legiti-
mate reasons for why their interests should trump those of others. In-
stead, “[t]hey have placed the community in a position to demand that 
the modern corporation serve not alone the owners or the control but all 
society.”44 The larger society’s legitimate demands on corporations en-
                                                                                                             
Governance, Commercial Profits, and Democratic Deficits, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1219, 1220 
(2011) (“Although Berle and Means’s The Modern Corporation forms the bedrock of the prevailing 
paradigm in corporate law and governance, it also contains some very suggestive materials from 
which to construct an alternative and more democratic way of proceeding that actually subverts and 
transforms the established model.”). 
 39. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 23, at 104; cf. Marc T. Moore & Antoine Rebérioux, Cor-
porate Power in the Public Eye: Reassessing the Implications of Berle’s Public Consensus Theory, 
33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1109, 1111–12 (2010) (noting that “it is customary to view Berle as having 
ideologically changed course over his scholarly career, from his initial position as a conservative 
shareholder wealth maximization advocate to his later position as a reformist communitarian theor-
ist,” but taking issue with this approach). 
 40. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 23, at 121 (quoting JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF 
A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN ERA 63 (1987)). Berle revisited and elaborated upon 
the themes of this last chapter in his 1959 book, Power Without Property. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., 
POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY (1959). 
 41. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3, at 311 (emphasis in original). 
 42. Id. Berle elaborates, suggesting that the risk of a trust relation is the risk of a “diminution of 
enterprise.” Id. In contrast, the risk of unbridled controller discretion is the “probability of an era of 
corporate plundering.” Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 312. 
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tailed a correlative duty by corporations to place the community’s inter-
ests first.45 
Berle predicted that the third option would prevail when the condi-
tions were ripe: “When a convincing system of community obligations is 
worked out and is generally accepted, in that moment the passive proper-
ty right of today must yield before the larger interests of society.”46 Con-
trollers would “develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a 
variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to 
each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather 
than private cupidity.”47 Put more strongly, business practice may “in-
creasingly assum[e] the aspect of economic statesmanship.”48 One possi-
ble outcome might be the reallocation of a corporation’s surplus away 
from shareholders in favor of higher wages, increased job security, and 
greater community service, which if generally accepted by the communi-
ty, would also have to be accepted by the courts.49 
Berle did not elaborate how the community’s obligations should be 
determined or advanced, saying simply that these interests should “be put 
forward with clarity and force.”50 He nonetheless indirectly addressed the 
question when he asked what causes or interests corporations should ad-
vance if they were “to make gifts to support philanthropy,” or were “trus-
tees for the community.”51 The answer, in Berle’s view, is not to be 
found in the realm of law, but rather in the “realm of philosophy.”52 
Nevertheless, Berle offered some suggestions based on what prom-
inent companies were doing during the 1950s. For example, he referred 
to companies that set up national or international plans that maintained 
the viability and growth of the companies’ industry. American oil com-
panies, in his view, brought “about more or less orderly development of 
one of the world’s great physical assets and have repeatedly avowed that 
their operations were the determining factor in national and international 
development.”53 Several corporations hired consultants to assist with 
their social contributions; one company established a working group to 
                                                 
 45. Id. (“Neither the claims of ownership nor those of control can stand against the paramount 
interests of the community.”). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 312–13. 
 48. Id. at 313. 
 49. Id. at 312. 
 50. Id. 
 51. BERLE, supra note 9, at 169. Similarly, Friedman asked, “How is [the corporate executive] 
to know how to spend it?” Friedman, supra note 2. 
 52. BERLE, supra note 9, at 173. 
 53. Id. at 171. 
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manage its philanthropy; some companies relied on their controllers’ 
high-level contacts at universities and charities to guide their community 
contributions; and several business schools began offering executive lev-
el education regarding broader social understandings of business.54 
Berle was concerned about the statist implications of a more com-
munitarian vision of corporations. He believed that most Americans 
thought “that private rather than governmental decisions are soundest for 
the community . . . .”55 Although the parameters of community interest 
remained largely undefined, one decision was that the state should not be 
dominant.56 Corporations were making, and should make, charitable do-
nations, if only to avoid a more active and intrusive government. Berle 
nonetheless foreshadowed the development of progressive corporate law 
by putting businesses on notice that “[i]f private business and business-
men do not assume community responsibilities, government must step in 
and American life will become increasingly statist.”57 This followed 
from the lesson, “constant throughout history,” that power does not re-
main unused, but is instead appropriated elsewhere.58 
The debate over CSR, which Berle helped start, is not a relic of the 
past; it is alive and well. But despite decades of commentary and scho-
larship, the legal debate has failed to advance CSR in any significant 
way. Moreover, passionate concern over CSR is cyclically fashionable. 
Several scholars have noted the cyclical nature of this debate. Stephen 
M. Bainbridge, for example, wrote: 
Just as sunspots come in cycles, so too does the corporate social re-
sponsibility debate. In the 1930s, we had the Berle-Dodd debate. In 
the 1950s, Berle and others revisited the issue. In the 1970s, there 
was a major fracas over corporate social responsibility. Finally, to-
day we have the nonshareholder constituency debate. . . . [E]ach ite-
ration adopts a new terminology, focuses on a slightly different fa-
cet of the problem, and develops some new ideas.59 
In a similar vein, Harwell Wells observed that “[v]iewed in histori-
cal perspective, it is clear that each new round of debate on corporate 
social responsibility largely recapitulates the earlier debate in a slightly 
                                                 
 54. Id. at 173–74. 
 55. Id. at 173. 
 56. Id. at 175 (providing the example of a donation to Princeton to avoid state domination of 
education and, thus, thinking). He noted that, at the time of writing, twenty-nine states had expressly 
authorized corporations to make charitable contributions. BERLE, supra note 9, at 168. 
 57. Id. at 167. 
 58. Id. at 172. 
 59. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 902–03 (citations omitted). 
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altered form.”60 Thus, although CSR may have good ideas about corpo-
rate behavior, it has generally failed to produce meaningful large-scale 
legal reform.61 The next Part examines the social enterprise movement, 
which shares some of CSR’s concerns, but attempts to advance them in a 
manner that moves beyond the parameters of the longstanding CSR de-
bate. It seeks to open a new front in the campaign to make businesses 
more socially responsible. 
III. SOCIAL ENTERPRISE MOVEMENT 
Having examined the origins of the modern CSR debate and Berle’s 
role in setting its terms, we now turn to what might be CSR’s latest itera-
tion—the social enterprise movement. The term “for-profit social enter-
prise” (or simply “social enterprise”) refers to businesses with sharehold-
er-owners that seek to address social problems by combining the dynam-
ism of capitalized for-profit enterprise with the intentionally pro-social 
orientation of nonprofit organizations.62 The idea of social enterprise has 
been embraced by a growing number of influential leaders and institu-
tions.63 Some leading proponents of social enterprise seek to promote and 
facilitate social enterprise formation through business organizations law, 
                                                 
 60. Wells, supra note 4 (noting that the Berle–Dodd exchange was “the first clear debate over 
corporate social responsibility”); cf. Stout, supra note 21, at 1190 (suggesting that academics “have 
made at least some intellectual progress over the intervening decades on the question of the proper 
role of the corporation”). 
 61. That the CSR movement has generally failed to produce meaningful large-scale legal 
reform is not to say that there has been no progress. But unlike changes in corporate law, there have 
been advances in areas of law such as those affecting labor, the environment, and consumer protec-
tion. These laws serve to cabin the discretion of management. See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra 
note 23, at 150. Some proponents of a more active role for corporate law remain unsatisfied, claim-
ing that corporate law may have a comparative advantage over other areas of law, or that the laws 
themselves remain inadequate. See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 141 
(2006); Faith Stevelman, Globalization and Corporate Social Responsibility: Challenges for the 
Academy, Future Lawyers, and Corporate Law, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 817, 833 (2008/2009) 
(“[C]ritics of CSR cannot, in good faith, counter that a corporation’s job is merely to conform to the 
existing regulations, because it is apparent that regulations and regulators cannot keep up with cor-
porations determined to outrun them.”). 
 62. See Katz & Page, supra note 12. “Other terms for members of this genus include hybrid 
social ventures, for-profit social businesses, social purpose business ventures, blended value organi-
zations, companies with a conscience, Fourth Sector organizations . . . for profit[s] with a nonprofit 
soul, and for-benefit organizations.” Id. at 61–62 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). The term “social enterprise” can be defined more broadly as an organization or venture—either 
for-profit or nonprofit—“that achieves its primary social or environmental mission using business 
methods, typically by operating a revenue-generating business.” Id. at 59 (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 63. See id. at 60–62. 
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most notably by supplying social entrepreneurs with new legal forms 
designed specifically for social enterprises.64 
The push for new forms reflects dissatisfaction with the seemingly 
binary nature of existing options—the for-profit corporation, which in-
clines controllers to increase shareholder wealth with little regard for the 
interests of nonshareholders and society at large, and the traditional cha-
ritable nonprofit organization, which primarily serves social purposes but 
has less access to capital and less leeway to compensate high-performing 
executives and employees. The first part of this section surveys various 
proposals for facilitating the creation and sustainability of social enter-
prise organizations. The second part identifies some of the advantages of 
such forms. This lays the groundwork for Part IV, which considers social 
enterprise within the context of the longstanding debate over CSR. 
A. Developing Alternate Legal Forms 
This section considers different organizational forms expressly in-
tended for a social enterprise housed in a single organizational structure: 
low-profit limited liability companies, benefit corporations, community 
interest companies, and socially responsible corporations. The first three 
have been enacted in one or more jurisdictions. The last form to date has 
not been enacted. 
1. L3Cs 
The low-profit limited liability company or “L3C” was introduced 
in Vermont in April, 2008, and has since been adopted in seven other 
states.65 A business organized as an L3C must pursue a charitable mis-
sion but can also distribute profits to its investors—although generating 
profit itself may not be a “significant” purpose.66 Supporters of the L3C 
describe it as “the for-profit with a nonprofit soul,”67 and claim that it 
                                                 
 64. See, e.g., AMS. FOR CMTY. DEV., http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2011) (L3Cs); B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net (last visited Mar. 29, 2011) 
(benefit corporations); discussion infra Part III.B; see also Katz & Page, supra note 12, at 62–63 
(discussing this movement). 
 65. In addition to Vermont, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, North Carolina, Utah, and 
Wyoming passed L3C legislation. Laws, AMS. FOR CMTY. DEV., http://www.americans 
forcommunitydevelopment.org/laws.php (last visited Mar. 29, 2011). The Crow Indian Nation and 
the Oglala Sioux Tribe have also allowed the L3C. Id. Several other states are currently considering 
L3C bills. See, e.g., S. 1503, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011); S. 501, 117th Gen. Assem., 1st 
Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011). 
 66. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(B) (2011). For convenience, we cite only to the Ver-
mont statute, but to date, all state L3C statutes include the quoted language. 
 67. Frequently Asked Questions, AMS. FOR CMTY. DEV., http://www.americansfor 
communitydevelopment.org/faqs.php (last visited Mar. 29, 2011). 
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“combines the best features of an LLC with the social conscience of a 
nonprofit.”68 
The L3C is an expressly dual-purpose LLC driven primarily by tax 
considerations. An L3C must meet three requirements: first, the company 
must “significantly further[] the accomplishment of one or more charita-
ble or educational purposes,” and would not have been formed but for its 
relationship to the accomplishment of such purpose(s).69 Second, “[n]o 
significant purpose of the company is the production of income or the 
appreciation of property . . . .”70 Lastly, the company must not be orga-
nized “to accomplish [any] political or legislative purposes . . . .”71 Com-
pliance with these three requirements qualifies the enterprise to accept 
“program-related investments” from charitable foundations, which under 
IRS regulations must be intended to further the foundation’s charitable or 
educational purpose, and must not be intended to produce income or 
have a prohibited purpose (like lobbying).72 
Proponents of the L3C form envision that its controllers can leve-
rage these program-related investments with private capital to achieve its 
social aims, which would also serve the investing foundation’s purpos-
es.73 On this model, investments in L3Cs would be structured in tranches: 
program-related investments would ideally take the riskiest position in 
the capital structure and receive no or lower returns, thereby lowering 
                                                 
 68. Caryn Capriccioso et al., Who is the L3C Entrepreneur?, AMS. FOR CMTY. DEV., 31 (May 
2010), http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/downloads/WhoistheL3Centrepreneur. 
pdf. 
 69. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A) (2011). 
 70. § 3001(27)(B). 
 71. § 3001(27)(C). 
 72. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1) (2011). Program-related investments are desirable from a 
foundation’s perspective, as they are included for the purposes of calculating whether a foundation 
has disbursed 5% of its assets per year, as generally required by federal law. Currently, foundations 
do not make much use of program-related investments because of the problem of determining 
whether the investments comply with IRS regulations. The key stumbling block is I.R.C. 
§ 4944(a)(1), which threatens to penalize the tax-exempt private foundation that “invests any amount 
in such a manner as to jeopardize the carrying out of any of its exempt purposes . . . .” The statute 
contains an exemption for “program-related investments,” defined as “investments, the primary 
purpose of which is to accomplish one or more [tax-exempt or charitable] purposes . . . and no sig-
nificant purpose of which is the production of income or the appreciation of property.” § 4944(c). 
The question that foundations must ask themselves is this: “Is the income, or return, from the pro-
gram-related investment not a significant purpose in making it?” Luther M. Ragin, Program Related 
Investments in Practice, 35 VT. L. REV 53, 55 n.5 (2010). 
 73. See, e.g., Marc J. Lane, L3Cs Hold Key to Solving State’s Social Woes, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS., 
Aug. 11, 2008, http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20080809/ISSUE07/100030399/l3cs-hold-
key-to-solving-states-social-woes; The Concept of the L3C, AMS. FOR CMTY. DEV., 
http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/concept.php (last visited Mar. 29, 2011) [he-
reinafter L3C Concept]. 
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risk and increasing returns for other equity investors.74 The top tranche 
might be at the risk-adjusted market rate of return. There might also be a 
“mezzanine” tranche, designed for investors willing to accept a lower 
return because of their contribution to social welfare. 
The L3C designation is intended to provide foundations with some 
assurances that a business will satisfy the tax law’s criteria for program-
related investments.75 To date, however, the IRS has not granted L3Cs 
any special privileges by virtue of the designation.76 Foundations thus 
still seek private letter rulings, and should perform appropriate diligence 
in order to comply with the treasury regulations regarding program-
related investments.77 
Because the legislation implementing L3Cs has been minimal, pro-
ponents recommend protecting the L3C’s social mission by contract in 
the operating agreement.78 This protection could take several forms. For 
example, LLC Class A members, intended for foundation investors, 
might have no right to distributions, but might have a “put,” which is the 
right to have the company redeem their membership interests at a pur-
chase price equivalent to the initial capital contribution.79 Members 
might also have a right of first refusal. Any member who wished to sell 
her membership interests must give the other members a right to buy 
those membership interests at a price equal to the lower of the offer she 
                                                 
 74. See L3C Concept, supra note 73. 
 75. Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, VT. SECRETARY ST., http://www.sec.state. 
vt.us/corps/dobiz/llc/llc_l3c.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2011); What is the L3C?, AMS. FOR CMTY. 
DEV., at 2, http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org (expand “Resources” menu; then follow 
“Whitepapers” hyperlink; then follow “1. What is the L3C?” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 1, 2011) 
(“Probably more importantly than anything else, the L3C is a brand . . . .”). 
 76. Americans for Community Development has drafted federal legislation, the Philanthropic 
Facilitation Act of 2010, that would amend § 4944(c) of the Internal Revenue Code and thereby 
make it easier for foundations to invest in L3Cs. This legislation has not been introduced in Con-
gress. Proposed Federal Legislation, AMS. FOR CMTY. DEV., http://www.americansfor 
communitydevelopment.org/proposedfedlegislation.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 77. This has been one of the main criticisms of the L3C. Foundations will unwittingly make 
program-related investments in L3Cs that prove ineligible, thereby jeopardizing the foundation’s tax 
status. See, e.g., J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited 
Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation Investment In Entre-
preneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273, 291–92 (2010); Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Decon-
structed: The “Emperor’s New Clothes” on the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 879, 889 (2010). 
 78. See, e.g., Introducing the new, socially responsible limited liability company, AMS. FOR 
CMTY. DEV., at 2, http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/downloads/Introducing_ 
the_L3C%20PowerPoint.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
 79. L3C Operating Agreement, INTERSECTOR L3C, § 6 (May 23, 2007) http://www.intersectorl
3c.com/goopages/pages_downloadgallery/downloadget.php?filename=5923_3592218.pdf&orig_na
me=L3COperatingAgreement_Short.pdf. 
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has already received or the fair market value of the membership interests, 
as determined by an independent appraiser.80 In addition, all members 
might have the right to veto the transfer through a unanimous consent 
provision. The manager could have more limited authority than in a con-
ventional LLC, in that the members’ consent could be required before the 
disposal of any of the LLC’s assets beyond the ordinary course of busi-
ness.81 Foundations, often sophisticated and well-advised, would protect 
an L3C’s social mission by negotiating effective mission maintenance 
mechanisms.82 
2. Benefit Corporations 
As of March 2011, Maryland, New Jersey, and Vermont have 
passed legislation creating a new type of entity called the “benefit corpo-
ration.”83 Colorado, Hawaii, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
and Virginia are also considering similar legislation.84 According to its 
proponents, benefit corporations provide an off-the-shelf organizational 
form for entrepreneurs to run a for-profit business without the worry of 
shareholder lawsuits based on a board’s failure to maximize shareholder 
wealth.85 This form can also promote transparency by requiring reports 
on the social mission.86 
Benefit corporations remain generally subject to the state’s corpo-
rate law.87 Typically, there is some form of compulsory “other constitu-
ency” statute, i.e., directors are required to consider other stakeholders.88 
                                                 
 80. Id. § 5. 
 81. Id. § 3.3. 
 82. See, e.g., Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 
TUL. L. REV. 337, 370 (2009) (“[T]he social benefit nonprofit actors can retain ultimate decision-
making power and thereby ensure that the firm remains committed to its social and/or environmental 
purpose.”). 
 83. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01 (West 2010); Act of Mar. 1, 2011, ch. 30, 
2011 N.J. Laws 1 (to be codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18); Vermont Benefit Corporations Act, 
No. 113, 2010 Vt. Acts & Resolves 1 (to be codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21) (effective 
July 1, 2011). 
 84. Benefit Corporation Legislation, B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/publicpolicy (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2011) (listing states and providing links to state bills). California also considered a 
similar legal form titled the “flexible purpose corporation.” See S. 1463, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2010). It too would have a social purpose in addition to making a profit. 
 85. See, e.g., Katrina vanden Heuvel, Making the Economy More Just, WASH. POST, Jul. 21, 
2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/20/AR2010072002754.html. 
 86. See generally Why B Corps Matter, B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/why (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Why B Corps Matter] (emphasizing “rigorous and independent standards” 
of transparency). 
 87. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-02(a). 
 88. The directors must take into consideration: (1) the stockholders; (2) the employees, subsid-
iaries, and suppliers; (3) the interests of customers as beneficiaries of the general public benefit 
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The entity does not, however, have any formal or enforceable fiduciary 
duties to its intended beneficiaries or other nonshareholding stakeholders 
unless expressly provided for.89 
A benefit corporation must create a general public benefit, and may 
also identify in its charter one or more specific public benefits.90 A gen-
eral public benefit is “a material, positive impact on society and the envi-
ronment, as measured by an [independent] third-party,” using transparent 
standards.91 A benefit corporation’s status must also appear prominently 
on any charter document or stock certificate of the corporation.92 Benefit 
corporations must deliver to each stockholder an annual benefit report 
that includes a description of the ways the corporation pursued the gen-
eral or specific public benefit and the extent to which that benefit was 
created.93 The report must also include any circumstances that hindered 
the creation of the benefit94 and “[a]n assessment of the societal and en-
vironmental performance of the [company] prepared in accordance with 
a third-party standard applied consistently with the prior year’s [report],” 
or with an explanation of any inconsistency with the prior year’s report.95 
                                                                                                             
created by the corporation; (4) community and societal considerations, for all of the communities in 
which the corporation, subsidiaries, or suppliers have offices or facilities; and (5) the impact on the 
local and global environment. Id. § 5-6C-07(a)(1). If appropriate, the directors may also consider 
other pertinent factors or the interests of any other groups. Id. § 5-6C-07(a)(2). 
 89. Id. § 5-6C-07(b). 
 90. The phrase “specific public benefits” includes: 
(1) [p]roviding . . . beneficial products or services; (2) [p]romoting economic opportunity 
for individuals or communities beyond the creation of jobs in the normal course of busi-
ness; (3) [p]reserving the environment; (4) [i]mproving human health; (5) [p]romoting 
the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge; (6) [i]ncreasing the flow of capital to 
entities with a public benefit purpose; or (7) [t]he accomplishment of any other particular 
benefit for society or the environment. 
Id. § 5-6C-01(d). 
 91. Id. § 5-6C-01(c). The third-party standard must be “developed by a person or entity that is 
independent from the benefit corporation” and must publicly identify the factors considered, weight 
given each factor, and state that developed or changed the standard. Id. § 5-6C-01(e). 
 92. Id. § 5-6C-05. 
 93. Id. § 5-6C-08(a)(1)(i). 
 94. Id. § 5-6C-08(a)(1)(iii). 
 95. Id. § 5-6C-08(a)(2). The Vermont benefit report has additional requirements: 
[1] a statement of the specific goals or outcomes identified by the benefit corporation for 
creating general public benefit and any specific public benefit for the period of the benefit 
report; [2] a description of the actions taken by the benefit corporation to attain the identi-
fied goals or outcomes and the extent to which the goals or outcomes were attained; [3] a 
description of any circumstances that hindered the attainment of the identified goals or 
outcomes and the creation of general public benefit or any specific public bene-
fit; . . . [4] specific actions the benefit corporation can take to improve its social and envi-
ronmental performance and attain the goals or outcomes identified for creating general 
public benefit and any specific public benefit; [5] an assessment of the social and envi-
ronmental performance of the benefit corporation prepared in accordance with a third-
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A corporation may terminate its status as a benefit corporation by delet-
ing the statement from its charter with either a majority or super-majority 
vote, depending on the jurisdiction.96 
Vermont’s law, like New Jersey’s but unlike Maryland’s,97 includes 
a provision creating a position called “benefit director.”98 The benefit 
director must be independent99 and elected or removed in the same way 
as the other directors,100 but has some additional obligations.101 The ben-
efit director coordinates the annual benefit report, including stating an 
opinion on whether the corporation and its directors and officers have 
acted in accordance with its benefit purposes.102 If there has been a fail-
ure to act, the benefit director must describe the failure.103 A “benefit 
enforcement proceeding,” which is a claim or action against a director or 
officer for failure to pursue the stated benefit(s) or violation of a duty or 
standard of conduct under the law, provides an enforcement mechan-
ism.104 People with standing to bring suit include shareholders, directors, 
10% or greater shareholders of the benefit corporation’s parent company, 
and anyone so identified in the corporation’s articles of incorporation.105 
                                                                                                             
party standard that has been applied consistently with prior benefit reports or accompa-
nied by an explanation of the reasons for any inconsistent application; [6] a statement of 
specific goals or outcomes identified by the benefit corporation and approved by the 
shareholders for creating general public benefit and any specific public benefit for the pe-
riod of the next benefit report; [7] the name of each benefit director and the benefit offic-
er, if any, and the address to which correspondence to each of them may be directed; [8] 
the compensation paid by the benefit corporation during the year to each director in that 
capacity; [9] the name of each person that owns beneficially or of record five percent or 
more of the shares of the benefit corporation; and [10] the statement of a benefit direc-
tor . . . . 
Vermont Benefit Corporations Act, No. 113, § 21.14(a), 2010 Vt. Acts & Resolves 1, 18–19 (to be 
codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(a)) (effective July 1, 2011). 
 96. Compare MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-04 (West 2010) (to terminate status, a 
benefit corporation must satisfy the same amendment requirements for all corporations), with Ver-
mont Benefit Corporations Act § 21.07(2) (termination requires at least a two-thirds super-majority). 
 97. Compare Vermont Benefit Corporations Act § 21.03(a)(2), and Act of Mar. 1, 2011, ch. 
30, § 14A:18-1, 2011 N.J. Laws ch. 30, with MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01 (West 
2010). 
 98. Vermont Benefit Corporations Act § 21.10. 
 99. Id. § 21.10(b). The criteria for independence is essentially identical to that used for a tradi-
tional corporation. See generally Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Inde-
pendence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 241–48 (examining definitions of independent directors). 
 100. Vermont Benefit Corporations Act § 21.10(b). 
 101. Id. § 21.10(a). 
 102. Id. § 21.10(c)(1), (3). 
 103. Id. § 21.10(c)(4). 
 104. Id. § 21.13(c)(1)–(2). 
 105. Id. § 21.13(b)(1)–(4). 
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The private sector has also created a hybrid corporate form for so-
cial enterprise promulgated under existing laws.106 B Lab, a nonprofit 
organization, promotes the formation of “B Corporations,” a self-
proclaimed “new type of corporation which uses the power of business to 
solve social and environmental problems.”107 B Lab provides a template 
that signals the existence of a social enterprise and encourages its forma-
tion.108 
Like the state-sanctioned benefit corporation, B Corporations are 
intended to “[m]eet comprehensive and transparent social and environ-
mental performance standards” and institutionalize stakeholder inter-
ests.109 B Corporations must be certified through third-party validation to 
meet “transparent, comprehensive social and environmental performance 
metrics.”110 Even more than the state forms, B Lab markets the power of 
branding (“billions of dollars of collective market presence”) and net-
working.111 If the B Corporation label catches on among consumers, this 
will help make the form sustainable. In fact, the founders optimistically 
predict that B Corporations, in a generation, will equal the size of today’s 
nonprofit sector.112 
B Corporations were expressly designed to address the profit-
maximization concerns regarding the corporation,113 but are also optimis-
tically claimed to solve intertemporal or mission maintenance con-
cerns,114 including profitability, succession, growth, and liquidity.115 The 
                                                 
 106. See B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 107. About Certified B Corps, B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/about (last visited Apr. 1, 
2011) [hereinafter About B Corps]; Who Certifies?, B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net (expand 
“About B Corp” menu; then select “Who Certifies?” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 108. See generally Become a B Corp, B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/become (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 109. About B Corps, supra note 107. 
 110. B Lab Legal Framework Objectives & Benefits, B. CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/ 
resources/bcorp/documents/%2FBLab_LegalFramework_2009.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2011) [herei-
nafter Objectives & Benefits]. 
 111. Benefits of Becoming a B Corporation, B. CORP., at 3, http://www.bcorporation.net/ 
resources/bcorp/documents/Bcorp_Benefits%2520of%2520B_Package.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 
2011). 
 112. B Lab’s Jay Coen Gilbert on What It Takes to Be a “B Corporation,” SUSTAINABLE LIFE 
MEDIA, http://www.sustainablelifemedia.com/content/feature/strategy/do_you_have_what_it_takes_
to_be_a_b_corporation (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
 113. See Why B Corps Matter, supra note 86. B Corporations also attempt to solve the signal-
ing problem, i.e., which companies are really good and which just have good marketing. Id. 
 114. Legal Roadmap, B. CORP., http://survey.bcorporation.net/legal.php (last visited Apr. 1, 
2011) (claiming to provide “a clear, step-by-step process to change the DNA of your business”). 
Intertemporal or mission-maintenance concerns are those regarding whether an organization will 
remain committed to a particular social mission over time and when confronted with challenges. 
Nonprofits, for example, have an asset lock. 
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key legal change for a B Corporation is to include an “other constituen-
cy” provision in its articles116 because B Corporations cannot be safely 
formed in states, such as Delaware, that lack an “other constituency” sta-
tute. The director’s goal remains the same: determining what is in “the 
best interests of the [corporation] and its shareholders . . . .”117 To do this, 
the director must “consider” all of the corporation’s stakeholders and the 
decision’s wider impact.118 The requirement is really just one of process; 
it requires consideration without requiring any particular result.119 It also 
gives enormous lawful discretion to the board of directors. As long as the 
directors “consider” the decision’s impact, it is effectively unreviewa-
ble.120 The early Berle might have characterized this as handing over 
power, “with a pious wish that something nice will come out of it all.”121 
For companies in some change-of-control situations, the provision 
would expressly remove the company from the so-called Revlon duty to 
maximize shareholder value.122 When Revlon applies, directors may only 
                                                                                                             
 115. Introducing the B Corporation, B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/resources/ 
bcorp/documents/2009%20B%20Corp_Intro_Package.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). These goals 
are achieved all “while taking care of our employees, community and the environment.” Id. 
 116. B Lab suggests the following provision: 
In discharging his or her duties, and in determining what is in the best interests of the 
Company and its shareholders, a Director shall consider such factors as the Director 
deems relevant, including, but not limited to, the long-term prospects and interests of the 
Company and its shareholders, and the social, economic, legal, or other effects of any ac-
tion on the current and retired employees, the suppliers and customers of the Company or 
its subsidiaries, and the communities in which the Company or its subsidiaries operate, 
(collectively, with the shareholders, the “Stakeholders”), together with the short-term, as 
well as long-term, interests of its shareholders and the effect of the Company’s operations 
(and its subsidiaries’ operations) on the economy of the state, the region and the nation. 
Legal Roadmap (Form Results), B. CORP., http://survey.bcorporation.net/legal.php (select “C Corpo-
ration” in “Corporate structure” field; then select “New Jersey” in “State of incorporation” field; 
then click “Next”) (last visited Apr. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Legal Roadmap Form Results]. “B Lab 
recognizes that this kind of provision may be less effective in states that do not have other constitu-
ency statutes.” Id. (select “C Corporation” in “Corporate structure” field; then select “Delaware” in 
“State of incorporation” field; then click “Next”). 
 117. Legal Roadmap Form Results, supra note 116. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Although B Lab asserts that this change would render directors accountable, it is hard to 
see how, in practice, any given decision could be challenged more successfully in a B Corporation 
than in a traditional corporation. What information would a director need to consider? Presumably 
the same standard as exists currently in Delaware: “all material information reasonably available to 
[the board].” Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds by 
Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
 120. As has been observed many times before, a person with many masters effectively has 
none. See, e.g., Page, supra note 21, at 994–95. 
 121. Berle, supra note 16, at 1368. 
 122. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) 
(holding that when the breakup of a company is inevitable, the board’s duty is “the maximization of 
the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit”). 
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consider those benefits to other stakeholders that are rationally related to 
shareholders’ pecuniary interests.123 Clearly, in a cash-out merger, share-
holders have no pecuniary interest besides maximizing the consideration 
they receive.124 The impact of the provision, however, is again, simply to 
give directors discretion regarding which takeover bid to accept. Whe-
reas under Revlon a director must accept the highest reasonably compa-
rable economic offer, a B Corporation director must only consider the 
takeover’s impact on all stakeholders, and then may accept a lower offer. 
There is no requirement that the B Corporation directors must accept a 
lower offer that has a better social impact. The “B Corporation” label 
signals to prospective investors the entity’s priorities and what they 
should expect.125 
3. Community Interest Companies 
Community Interest Companies (CICs) were introduced in the 
United Kingdom in 2005 by Tony Blair’s government, and were de-
signed expressly to meet the needs of social enterprise.126 CICs are com-
panies intended to produce a community benefit by dedicating their as-
sets and much of their profits to that purpose.127 
The two key legal features of CICs are a “community interest test” 
and “asset lock.”128 The community interest test is relatively broad. “A 
company satisfies the community interest test if a reasonable person 
might consider that its activities are being carried on for the benefit of 
the community.”129 Political campaigning, however, is excluded.130 The 
                                                 
 123. Id. 
 124. Arguably, this does not matter because it is generally fairly easy to avoid Revlon duties, or 
alternatively, many states’ other constituency laws expressly disavow Revlon duties. See, e.g., IND. 
CODE § 23-1-35-1(f) (2011). 
 125. Objectives & Benefits, supra note 110. As B Lab notes, the corporation’s social goals are 
in the articles and thus “explicitly disclosed in a capital raise, ensuring the mission-alignment of new 
investors.” Id. 
 126. See William Davies, How to Tame Capitalism, NEW STATESMAN, Sept. 13, 2004, at 33. 
 127. See CMTY. INTEREST COS., http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 
2, 2011). 
 128. Id. 
 129. The Community Interest Company Regulations, 2005, S.I. 1788 (U.K.), http://www. 
legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2005/1788/contents/made. The community interest test in the United King-
dom reflects, in part, differences between the English and American branches of Anglo-Saxon law. 
The United Kingdom’s definition of a legally charitable purpose is narrower than the definition used 
in the United States. In both countries, a prospective charity might try to assimilate by analogy its 
organization’s proposed purpose under one of the traditional charitable headings. In the United 
Kingdom, if the organization’s purpose does not fit, it will not qualify as a charity. In the United 
States, the courts default to something like a “reasonable person” standard. The CIC structure is not 
solely about creating a special structure for social enterprise—it is also a way to break open the box 
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organization also must not limit access to its benefits to too small a 
group.131 
“Asset lock” is the term used for all provisions that ensure the 
CIC’s assets and profits are used primarily for the benefit of the commu-
nity and not for the excessive benefit of employees, contractors, or inves-
tors.132 Suppliers of goods and services may not be compensated beyond 
full market value. Thus, salaries “must not be disproportionately high in 
relation to [employees’] abilities and the services they perform.”133 In-
vestors may buy shares, but dividends are capped, both at a specific rate 
of return and as a percentage of profits that can be paid in aggregate div-
idends.134 At liquidation, shareholders are limited to receiving back the 
amount of their investment in the company.135 In essence, a CIC’s share-
holders are much more like holders of preferred stock. 
A CIC must also issue a “community interest company report” 
along with its annual financial filing. This report must address: “[1] how 
the company’s activities have benefited the community; [2] what steps 
were taken to consult stakeholders and what was the outcome; [3] what 
payments were made to directors; [4] what assets were transferred other 
than for full consideration; [5] what dividends were paid; and [6] what 
performance-related interest was paid on loans or debentures.”136 
Enforcement is provided by a state regulator. The regulator may in-
tervene if a CIC no longer meets the community interest test, and res-
ponses could include replacing the directors or managers, transferring 
assets, or winding up the CIC’s operations.137 In essence, the regulator’s 
role is analogous to states’ attorneys’ general supervision of charities.138 
                                                                                                             
that U.K. charity law has gotten itself into by defining the list of legally recognized charitable pur-
poses so narrowly. 
 130. The Community Interest Company Regulations, 2005, S.I. 1788, art. 2, ¶ 3 (U.K.). 
 131. Id. art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 132. Frequently Asked Question[s], CMTY. INTEREST COS., 5 (Oct. 2009), 
http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/index.shtml (follow “Leaflets” hyperlink; then follow “Frequently 
asked questions” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 2, 2011). 
 133. Id. 
 134. A CIC is limited to paying out 35% of its profit and carrying forward any unused dividend 
capacity to five years. 
 135. The Community Interest Company Regulations, 2005, S.I. 1788, art. 6, ¶ 23 (U.K.). 
 136. Frequently Asked Question[s] for Funding Organisations, CMTY. INTEREST COS., 5 (Oct. 
2009), www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter%206%20-%20Feb%202010.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2011). 
 137. See, e.g., The Community Interest Company Regulations, 2005 S.I. 1788 art. 6, ¶ 23(6) 
(U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2005/1788/contents/made (last visited Apr. 
2, 2011) (presenting Regulator’s control over distribution of assets on dissolution). 
 138. The United States has responded to inadequate Attorney General supervision by using the 
IRS to act as regulator of charities and tax exempt nonprofits. 
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Importantly, the CIC is intended to provide a brand identity for so-
cial enterprise, which could help lower its transaction costs.139 The gov-
ernment explained: “As the concept of social enterprise becomes more 
widely understood by the finance community, social entrepreneurs 
should find it easier to explain what they are doing and to get a competi-
tive price for finance. Clear recognition of the CIC form will help this 
process.”140 
4. Socially Responsible Corporations 
Some progressives have proposed an organizational form that 
adopts some of the features of progressive corporate law, notably stake-
holder representation. In particular, state legislators in Minnesota pro-
posed legislation that would give businesses the option of incorporating 
as a “socially responsible” for-profit business corporation.141 Businesses 
choosing this designation would be required to allot 20% of their board 
for worker-elected representatives, and another 20% for board-selected 
directors to “represent and advocate for the public interest.”142 This pro-
posal carries both the hallmarks of social enterprise, in that this is an op-
tional form, and progressive corporate law, in that certain stakeholders 
are expressly privileged in a relatively uniform way across entities orga-
nized under this form. 
B. Increasing the Number of Social Enterprises and  
Achieving Visions and Missions 
Efforts to combine for-profit and nonprofit features and tendencies 
in a single structure can, to say the least, be problematic.143 States may, 
however, be able to promote social welfare by creating organizational 
forms that supply ready-made or off-the-rack means to solve or at least 
                                                 
 139. Community Interest Companies (CICs), DEP’T TRADE & INDUSTRY, http://www.dti. 
gov.uk/cics/faqs.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2011). 
 140. Id. 
 141. S. 510, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2009). 
 142. “The directors of a corporation . . . must include directors whose role as directors includes 
representation of, and advocacy for, the interests of the corporation’s employees and of the public 
interest.” Id. § 304A.06(a). “At least 20 percent of the corporation’s directors must represent and 
advocate for the corporation’s employees. These directors must be nominated and elected by the 
employees, through a process specified in the bylaws.” Id. § 304A.06(b). “At least 20 percent of the 
corporation’s directors must represent and advocate for the public interest. These directors must be 
elected by the other board members, after seeking input from persons or groups representing the 
public interest.” Id. § 304A.06(c). 
 143. See Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the 
Sale of a Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 230–31 (2010) (describing perceived problems 
of corporate law for socially oriented companies). 
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mitigate such problems. Most notably, they can reduce transaction costs 
for aspiring social entrepreneurs, provide them with conspicuous and 
inexpensive signals to potential supporters who share their social aims, 
shape preferences by enabling and encouraging prospective entrepre-
neurs to pursue broader social aims, and nudge controller and employee 
behavior in more other-regarding directions. 
Transaction costs can be thought of as friction interfering with the 
free exchange of rights and obligations.144 Transaction costs may include 
those costs incurred by searching for information about the transaction 
(e.g., which stock or house to buy), bargaining (e.g., the process of sort-
ing offers and counteroffers in setting the price of a house), and policing 
and enforcing the agreement (e.g., suing the home buyer to complete the 
transaction in a falling real estate market). 
New legal forms designed specifically for social enterprises could 
make it less costly for social entrepreneurs to launch such enterprises by 
manipulating the forms supplied by current organizational law. There 
would be fewer wheels for social entrepreneurs and their legal advisors 
to reinvent. As the forms become more common, there would be less 
need for the social entrepreneur to explain and bargain over standard 
provisions. Gradually, a market norm could emerge and become ac-
cepted. This virtuous spiral, at least with respect to transaction costs, 
might mirror the behavior of venture capitalists and angel investors in 
Silicon Valley. There, various standard market norms and organizational 
structures have become common, facilitating the efficient funding and 
development of start-ups, even if, when starting on a blank slate, other 
organizational structures might be more effective.145 
These new forms may cultivate and solidify more socially respon-
sible norms within the firms that adopt them. Social norms are “customa-
                                                 
 144. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a transaction cost as “a cost connected with a process 
transaction, such as a broker’s commission, the time and effort expended to arrange a deal, or the 
cost involved in litigating a dispute.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 398 (9th ed. 2009). Ronald Coase 
famously explored the problem with his discussion of the “costs of using the price mechanism” in 
his landmark article, The Nature of the Firm. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 
386, 390 (1937). Oliver E. Williamson can be credited with popularizing the term. See Oliver E. 
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. LAW & 
ECON. 233 (1979). 
 145. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Law-
yers, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1301, 1339 (2001) (observing that “[i]n the VC financing stage, for example, 
Silicon Valley lawyers use ‘cookie cutter’ forms into which they ‘cram’ deals that do not completely 
fit”). 
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ry rules of behavior that coordinate our interactions with others.”146 A 
common criticism of corporations is that through their norm of profit 
maximization, they encourage executives to make antisocial decisions 
and that, absent the corporation, the decision-maker would make more 
“ethical” decisions.147 In a nonprofit organization, the controllers and 
employees should feel less pressure to make decisions that maximize the 
entity’s net earnings at society’s expense. New organizational forms 
promise to promote social action more consistently than the conventional 
corporate form. For example, by altering decision-making procedures—
say, by requiring controllers to consider how significant decisions would 
affect their mission and not simply profits—new forms could subtly alter 
controllers’ agendas in more pro-social directions. 
A third potential advantage of new forms is to increase the demand 
for the forms themselves and, with it, the supply of socially motivated 
entrepreneurial activity. The founder of a prospective business, when 
presented with an expanded array of organizational forms on the secre-
tary of state’s website or at her office, may find that the new form serves 
her social aspirations better than any of the longstanding options. Enact-
ing the new form and making it readily available could serve to market 
the form itself. 
A new organizational form could also serve a signaling or branding 
function toward potential customers. Some customers prefer, all things 
being equal, to trade with an organization that has a social mission rather 
than with a more conventional profit-maximizing corporation. Consum-
ers who buy fair trade coffee, or Product (RED) may only be the tip of 
this particular iceberg. 
There is admittedly some risk that social enterprises will divert re-
sources from the nonprofit sector instead of attracting resources that 
would otherwise go to conventional for-profit corporations.148 There is 
also a risk that some social enterprises will prove to be wolves in sheep’s 
clothing. In other words, they will derive benefits from signaling their 
                                                 
 146. H. Peyton Young, Social Norms, NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS ONLINE, 
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_S000466&edition=current (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2011). 
 147. See, e.g., Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational 
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 199, 
n.254 (2003) (“[D]irectors and executives who work within firms face strong cultural norms to max-
imize profits and are given extensive training in business schools or by the firms themselves. The 
American business culture promotes the idea that ‘business is business’ and considerations other 
than profit are irrelevant to decisions.”). 
 148. See, e.g., Laura Otten, A Tough Hybrid to Swallow—the L3C, NONPROFIT UNIV. BLOG 
(Nov. 19, 2009, 1:12 PM), http://www.nonprofituniversityblog.org/2009/11/a-tough-hybrid-to-
swallow-the-l3c3. 
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social orientation but, absent an effective enforcement mechanism, will 
not actually be any better than conventional corporations. These risks 
may be worth taking. The social enterprise movement’s optimistic hope 
is that not only will more socially responsible organizations be formed, 
but that these entities will also be more effective in achieving their social 
missions than the traditional nonprofits. 
Lastly, as a practical matter, the enactment and provision of new 
forms designed for social enterprises seems less likely to arouse opposi-
tion than, say, legislation to advance progressive corporate law’s agen-
da.149 A business’s decision to adopt these forms is wholly voluntary as 
well as conspicuous to the business’s potential investors, who can make 
decisions and adjust their expectations accordingly. The social enterprise 
movement’s incremental approach to change through organizational law 
may therefore be politically more viable. 
IV. FROM CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PROGRESSIVE 
CORPORATE LAW TO SOCIAL ENTERPRISE? 
Part II examined the CSR debate that Berle helped frame. That de-
bate’s main trope is whether corporate directors should aim to maximize 
shareholder value rather than serve the interests of nonshareholders and 
society at large.150 We also saw how support for a larger government role 
in shaping corporate governance coalesced under the label of progressive 
corporate law—in many ways the most muscular and structural iteration 
of CSR.151 Part III examined the social enterprise movement and its legal 
                                                 
 149. New Jersey’s benefit corporation legislation, for example, passed unanimously in both 
houses. Bill Allowing For-Profits To Organize As Issue-Driven Companies Now Law, N.J. TODAY, 
Mar. 7, 2011, http://njtoday.net/2011/03/07/bill-allowing-for-profits-to-organize-as-issue-driven-
companies-now-law/#ixzz1Hv5tfe6C. 
 150. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, New Principles for Corporate Law, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 89, 
91 (2005) (observing that the corporation is “an instrument to serve the collective good, broadly 
defined”). 
 151. See, e.g., id. at 95 (arguing that the “crucial” question is “how we construct a legal 
framework for corporations that maximizes the probability that businesses serve the interests of 
society as a whole”); Marleen A. O’Connor, Promoting Economic Justice in Plant Closings: Explor-
ing the Fiduciary/Contract Law Distinction to Enforce Implicit Employment Agreements, in 
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at 219 (arguing that corporate law should recognize 
that corporate managers have certain legal (and legally enforceable?) responsibilities to the corpora-
tion’s workers and their families); see also Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” 
and the New Corporate Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 639 (2001) (“In the late 
1990s, a new corporate social responsibility movement [i.e., that goes by the name of ‘progressive 
corporate law’] has gained considerable momentum.”). In Branson’s view, PCL’s tone is “more 
muted” and “less shrill” than CSR’s iteration in the 1970s, which he says called for such things as 
“federal chartering, federal minimum standards, mandatory public interest directors, and ‘power to 
the people.’” Id. at 647. 
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agenda, which promotes new organizational forms designed specifically 
for for-profit businesses that integrate a social mission or, one might say, 
are constitutionally committed to being socially responsible. This Part 
compares and distinguishes CSR, progressive corporate law, and social 
enterprise along key axes, and contrasts them with mainstream corporate 
law. In particular, this Part shows how social enterprise both advances 
and partly sidesteps the hoary CSR debate started by Dodd and Berle. 
We begin by asking if social enterprise is “the new CSR,” and an-
swer the question in the negative. The proposed connection is not neces-
sarily flattering, as many commentators believe that the CSR debate is 
jejune.152 So the question—“Is social enterprise the new CSR?”—is 
another way of asking whether the social enterprise movement is yet one 
more iteration of CSR, albeit with (as was said of progressive corporate 
law) some “new terminology,” a focus “on a slightly different facet of 
the problem,” and a few new ideas?153 In our view, the social enterprise 
movement is significantly more substantive and interesting than that cha-
racterization. As we show, it appropriates some CSR notions and shares 
some CSR sensibilities, but combines them in a way that should please 
corporate contractarians while alarming progressive corporate law pro-
ponents and discomforting some CSR proponents. This leads to a counte-
rintuitive conclusion: while corporate contractarians can wholeheartedly 
embrace the creation of new legal forms for social enterprises, some pro-
gressive corporate law proponents might find grounds to object to that 
project. 
CSR and the social enterprise movement seem like fruits of the 
same tree. Their proponents seek answers to the same core questions: 
How can more businesses be induced to do more to address pressing so-
cial and environmental problems? What changes—including changes to 
the law of business organizations—would lead more businesses to take 
the interests of nonshareholders and society more seriously? 
While these schools ask the same or similar questions, they use dif-
ferent approaches to supply answers. Mainstream corporate law—the 
baseline from which we assess movement and perhaps progress—seeks 
to reduce the agency costs that shareholder–principals incur with respect 
to manager–agents by using shareholder exit rights, under-enforced fidu-
                                                 
 152. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 902–03; Wells, supra note 4; see, e.g., Henry N. Butler & 
Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy 
in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1195 (1999) (“[L]egal, 
political, social, and economic commentators have debated corporate social responsibility ad nau-
seam.”). 
 153. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 903. 
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ciary duties, the market for corporate control, more potent norms and 
market forces, and other mechanisms intended to constrain controller 
action and align incentives more closely with shareholder interests.154 It 
attempts to encourage (or require) controllers to make decisions that ben-
efit shareholders.155 
CSR, however, tries to encourage current controllers of large corpo-
rations to make decisions more beneficial to society. It uses extralegal 
strategies such as self-regulation, external monitoring, and consumer ac-
tivism.156 It also looks to government to encourage pro-social behavior 
by authorizing corporate controllers to engage in corporate philanthro-
py157 and to consider nonshareholder interests when making decisions.158 
It is not, however, revolutionary, or even particularly challenging to the 
status quo.159 
Progressive corporate law focuses on changing decision-making by 
restructuring corporate law and its governance requirements in ways 
thought to better serve the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders.160 
The way to improve decision-making is to alter the decision-makers. 
This might be done by expanding the composition of corporate boards to 
include representation of other stakeholders. Other formal ways for 
stakeholders to advance their interests might include expanding their 
standing to sue. 
Where CSR and progressive corporate law would induce controllers 
of existing businesses to make better decisions, the social enterprise 
                                                 
 154. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, 
PROMISES BROKEN 5–17 (2008); William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: 
Critical Perspectives From History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1478 (1989) (“[F]irm contracts take 
forms determined by the now well known imperative of agency cost reduction.”). 
 155. See, e.g., MACEY, supra note 154, at 9; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 441. 
 156. See, e.g., Crane et al., supra note 1, at 5 (describing one view of CSR “as a framework of 
‘soft regulation’ that places new demands on corporations”); Joe Nocera, The Paradoxes of Busi-
nesses as Do-Gooders, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2006, at C1 (“[W]hat initially spurred the modern 
corporate social responsibility movement was the rise of nonprofit activist groups, which pushed and 
prodded—and boycotted—companies to force them toward, say, treating workers better in develop-
ing countries.”). 
 157. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2010) (allowing corporations to “[m]ake dona-
tions for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes, and in time of war or 
other national emergency in aid thereof”). 
 158. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2009). New York’s other constitu-
ency statute is typical: it permits, without requiring, a board in its decision-making to consider inter-
ests such as those of employees or the communities in which it does business. Id. 
 159. See, e.g., Nocera, supra note 156 (quoting the cofounder of Paul Hawken as saying “cor-
porate social responsibility is a very safe place . . . . By safe, I mean it doesn’t challenge the business 
model.”). 
 160. Page, supra note 21, at 993–97. 
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movement seeks structures that would enable social entrepreneurs to 
create businesses that pursue double or triple bottom lines and not subor-
dinate mission to profits. Part III examined several legal forms for such 
structures. The L3C model is premised on contracts and tax law. In the 
ideal case, an L3C-type social enterprise would obtain program-related 
investments from tax-exempt charitable foundations. These investments 
would be contingent on the enterprise’s continued pursuit of its social 
mission, which the foundation has incentive to monitor, and perhaps in-
fluence, so as to avoid endangering its tax-exempt status.161 The founda-
tion’s monitoring and control rights would be determined by contract, 
which sophisticated foundations would be able to negotiate and enforce 
on their own.162 In the certification or accreditation model, exemplified 
by benefit corporations and B Corporations, a business seeks confirma-
tion of its social enterprise bona fides from an independent third party 
such as B-Lab. Other approaches would put independent directors on an 
enterprise’s board of directors to act as reporters and mission monitors. 
Another approach, reminiscent of the nonprofit form, would cap inves-
tors’ financial returns, as demonstrated by the community interest com-
pany, and as suggested by the L3C’s requirement that profit-making not 
be a “significant purpose.”163 
Which approach yields more socially responsible business activity? 
In the markets for sales and corporate control, corporations that act in 
more socially responsible ways may put themselves at a competitive dis-
advantage compared to corporations that are less conscientious. Such 
corporations, for example, may be more vulnerable to takeover by profit-
seeking controllers eager to recapture wealth transferred to nonshare-
holder stakeholders. Progressive corporate law proponents would be ex-
pected to advocate for statutory minimums to counteract these races to 
the bottom. 
Like conventional corporations that practice CSR, businesses set up 
as social enterprises may be more vulnerable to firms that focus on a sin-
gle bottom line. Yet these businesses might also have more success in 
attracting investors, employees, and consumers who sympathize with 
                                                 
 161. See, e.g., John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Frame-
work for L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 155 (2010) (noting that an 
L3C provides a distinct advantage for “foundations and other charities that are going to be more 
likely to remain vigilant and expect loyalty to charitable purposes [than for-profit partners]”). 
 162. Luther Ragin, Vice President, Investments, The F.B. Heron Foundation, PRIs in Practice, 
Feb 19, 2010. 
 163. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(B) (2011) (“No significant purpose of the company is 
the production of income or the appreciation of property . . . .”). Foundations investing in L3Cs 
might also negotiate contractual limits on other investors’ returns. 
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their missions. Thus, L3Cs would aggressively seek investments from 
charitable foundations, which might be more willing to accept low or no 
returns and subsidize investors seeking market returns, in order to in-
crease the capital available to socially minded businesses. Similarly, 
some employees might be more willing to accept lower salaries from 
social enterprises than from profit-maximizing businesses, in the same 
way that some employees for charities accept lower salaries in exchange 
for warm glow or psychic income.164 
Some differences among the schools reflect differences in emphasis 
rather than substance. CSR and social enterprise, for example, are di-
rected toward businesses at different stages in the corporate lifecycle. 
Proponents of CSR and progressive corporate law generally focus on 
large and established businesses.165 (Berle, too, was expressly concerned 
with the largest companies and their increasing dominance of the U.S. 
economy.)166 The scale of such businesses permit Kent Greenfield, a 
leading progressive corporate law scholar, to assert that improving their 
governance “would have positive impacts on . . . stagnant wages for 
blue-collar workers and stark income inequality.”167 Social enterprise 
proponents, by contrast, go for depth over breadth: they focus on bud-
ding social entrepreneurs, who may be more amenable to adopting a per-
vasively pro-social structure for their businesses. Even so, many propo-
nents believe that social enterprise will ultimately be transformative and 
lead to large-scale change.168 
Other differences go deeper. CSR and especially progressive corpo-
rate law lean toward the left-liberal side of the political spectrum, while 
the social enterprise movement is more libertarian in orientation. This is 
reflected in how each deals with the “S” word—socialism. Critics, nota-
                                                 
 164. See, e.g., Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1223 (2010); 
Note, Federal Income Taxation of Employee Fringe Benefits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1141, 1147 (1976) 
(defining psychic income as “the cash valuation of satisfaction obtained from the performance of 
one’s job”). 
 165. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 4, at 80 (stating that “[f]irst, corporate social responsibility is 
about big business”); Greenfield, supra note 150, at 96 (noting that among the various business 
forms, the publicly traded corporation is the most broadly successful “in providing the framework 
for large business enterprises” (emphasis added)). 
 166. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 167. See GREENFIELD, supra note 61, at 3. 
 168. See, e.g., J. Gregory Dees, The Meaning of “Social Entrepreneurship,” CTR. FOR 
ADVANCEMENT SOC. ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 4 (May 30, 2001), http://www.caseatduke.org/ 
documents/dees_sedef.pdf (stating that the founders of social enterprise “seek to create systemic 
changes” with the “potential to stimulate global improvements”); What is a Social Entrepreneur?, 
ASHOKA FOUND., http://www.ashoka.org/social_entrepreneur (claiming that “social entrepreneurs 
act as the change agents for society . . . come[] up with new solutions to social problems and then 
implement[] them on a large scale”). 
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bly Friedman, have not hesitated to label the CSR and progressive corpo-
rate law initiatives as socialist.169 Marjorie Kelly, a leader in pro-social 
corporate redesign, tackles the issue head on. “Some may wonder if these 
alternative designs are intended to promote or lead to socialism but in 
fact the concept of private ownership is deeply intrinsic to them. Instead 
of doing away with private ownership, these firms redesign it.”170 Pro-
gressive corporate law proponents tread more lightly. For example, in 
The Failure of Corporate Law, Greenfield does not broach the subject of 
socialism until the book’s postscript, where he asserts that his progres-
sive approach to corporate law “is hardly inconsistent with capital-
ism.”171 
In execution, the various approaches will tend to benefit different 
sets of nonshareholder interests. CSR generally allows for the soft elabo-
ration of norms and diffuse dispersal of benefits to corporate “stakehold-
ers” broadly understood, which can extend to the community at large or 
even global society and the planet. Berle, for example, wrote of corpora-
tions making decisions in line with the clearly expressed sentiments of 
the community, albeit without the hard regulation of laws.172 In practice, 
however, CSR would likely result in benefits only to the most sympathet-
ic of stakeholders. Progressive corporate law, on the other hand, would 
have the state identify the groups to be benefited through legislative fiat, 
with the leading beneficiaries being a company’s employees, followed by 
the “communities in which the company employs a significant percen-
tage of the workforce . . . .”173 
Proponents of social enterprise also believe businesses should af-
firmatively seek to benefit nonshareholders.174 The critical difference is 
                                                 
 169. See Friedman, supra note 2. Bainbridge also identifies links between “stakeholderism” 
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that they would give the founders of social enterprises far more leeway to 
define their specific missions and select which nonshareholders—
including non-stakeholders—to privilege. It is each social entrepreneur’s 
choice, and the choice of those backing her, rather than the sense of the 
CSR community or the mandate of the state.175 The founder of a social 
enterprise might thus seek to benefit one set of stakeholders to the detri-
ment of others with perhaps stronger claims on the enterprise’s sur-
plus.176 Alternatively, the founder might seek to benefit the world as a 
whole. Yet some CSR proponents might think the selection of some be-
neficiaries unfair, “in the sense that a case could be made that a corpora-
tion should limit its selection process [for social projects] to considering 
those in need among its stakeholders,” e.g., its employees, customers, 
suppliers, and local community.177 
Life can be unfair, and the various approaches address somewhat 
different sources of unfairness. Fairness depends in large part on 
people’s reasonable expectations.178 Investors who made their invest-
ments under a regime of shareholder wealth maximization might reason-
ably expect such a regime to continue. Where investors are advised ex 
ante that a specific firm or class of firms might sometimes advance social 
benefits at the shareholders’ expense, they cannot justly complain about 
unfair treatment. Such complaints might be more valid regarding CSR, to 
the extent it significantly changes corporate decision-making away from 
the preexisting or reasonably expected norm. Investors’ cries of unfair-
ness seem even more justified regarding progressive corporate law: to the 
degree that it significantly changes the baseline rules for allocating a 
corporation’s surplus, it would effectively transfer some of the current 
shareholders’ wealth to nonshareholding stakeholders. With social enter-
prise, by contrast, firms that adopt a more pro-social form explicitly and 
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conspicuously inform investors up front that the firm will sometimes 
pursue its social mission, even where it does not maximize shareholder 
wealth. Here the fairness concerns result from abrupt changes in the 
quantum of contribution. An investor reasonably expecting, say, 20% of 
potential profits to be diverted toward a social mission, might consider 
themselves treated unfairly if that portion increased to 60%. 
Because of its libertarian approach to social change, the social en-
terprise movement is compatible with a contractarian understanding of 
corporate law. In this respect, the social enterprise movement continues 
the CSR debate from a different point of view—that is, it offers a rejoind-
er to CSR from a contractarian perspective. Under mainstream corporate 
law, shareholder wealth maximization is the default norm in publicly 
traded corporations.179 Critically, these defaults are non-mandatory and 
so subject to contrary agreement.180 This leaves open the possibility that 
a corporation’s shareholders can “mak[e] side bargains with other consti-
tuencies” and stakeholders.181 Corporations may pursue the opt-out route 
by memorializing their social commitments through statements in their 
charters or bylaws. For example, in its certificate of incorporation, the 
Washington Post Company declares its purpose “to publish . . . an inde-
pendent newspaper dedicated to the welfare of the community and the 
nation, in keeping with the principles of a free press.”182 In large publicly 
traded corporations, however, the opt-out route is often not viable be-
cause of high transaction costs, and midstream changes in corporate poli-
cy away from shareholder maximization, even when endorsed by a ma-
jority of shareholders, raise the expropriation concern mentioned 
above.183 Yet in the context of a close corporation, as Bainbridge ob-
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served, the transaction costs of bargaining around default rules are far 
lower. “The contractarian model thus seems especially apt for the close 
corporation context.”184 Similar conditions can be found in start-up social 
enterprises, making it easier for parties to actually bargain for something 
to maximize besides shareholder wealth. 
CSR and progressive corporate law proponents could find much to 
dislike about the social enterprise movement. At present, the social en-
terprise movement has generated more publicity than change. Yet even if 
the social enterprise movement succeeds on its own terms—if, say, every 
state, territory, and Indian nation enacts new hybrid organizational forms 
and a growing share of newly formed businesses adopt these forms—it 
will be quite some time before we see large-scale change. CSR propo-
nents may thus realistically fear that the social enterprise movement will 
“steal their thunder” and divert resources from advancing CSR’s agenda, 
which can effect more change faster through incremental improvements 
at large long-standing businesses. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The CSR debate continues unresolved, despite nearly eighty years 
of commentary. On one side are those who, like early Berle, contend that 
the board of directors’ paramount duty is to maximize value for share-
holders. On the other are those who, following later Berle, contend that 
corporations have broader and wider responsibilities that extend to non-
shareholding stakeholders, including employees, suppliers, creditors, and 
society at large. Two major strategies evolved to induce corporations to 
act upon these duties. The mainstream CSR movement promoted extra-
legal strategies, including self-regulation, external monitoring, and so-
cially responsible investing. The “progressive” corporate law movement 
advocated structural changes in corporate law itself designed to serve the 
interests of nonshareholders with a stake in a corporation’s activities, 
such as “other constituency” statutes that expand directors’ discretion. 
Most would agree, however, that neither movement produced much real 
change. 
Recently, a new approach to business organizations law has 
emerged that promotes the creation of new organizational forms for 
businesses. Loosely termed “social enterprises,” these for-profit busi-
nesses expressly aim to both generate profits for owners and pursue a 
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social mission. The social enterprise movement has had striking legisla-
tive successes in the last three years, introducing in ten states (as of 
March 2011) new organizational forms that are designed specifically for 
businesses with a “double bottom line.” 
Although social enterprise and CSR seem like fruits of the same 
tree, each draws some support from different and somewhat antagonistic 
sources and inclines in somewhat different—if not opposing—directions. 
Social enterprise’s emphasis on the individual social entrepreneur’s vi-
sion indicates a more libertarian orientation, unlike more robust iterations 
of CSR that strike some as socialistic. Social enterprise embraces a 
broader array of social missions and intended beneficiaries than those 
encouraged by CSR. Indeed, a social enterprise could be adverse and 
even unfair to certain interests favored by CSR, mostly notably to a busi-
ness’s more immediate stakeholders. The differences between social en-
terprise and CSR may be more striking than the similarities and, for 
some CSR proponents, even lamentable. 
